as and Polus, and therefore he sometimes appears to
be careless of the ordinary requirements of logic. Yet in the highest
sense he is always logical and consistent with himself. The form of the
argument may be paradoxical; the substance is an appeal to the higher
reason. He is uttering truths before they can be understood, as in all
ages the words of philosophers, when they are first uttered, have found
the world unprepared for them. A further misunderstanding arises out of
the wildness of his humour; he is supposed not only by Callicles, but
by the rest of mankind, to be jesting when he is profoundly serious. At
length he makes even Polus in earnest. Finally, he drops the argument,
and heedless any longer of the forms of dialectic, he loses himself in
a sort of triumph, while at the same time he retaliates upon his
adversaries. From this confusion of jest and earnest, we may now return
to the ideal truth, and draw out in a simple form the main theses of the
dialogue.

First Thesis:--

It is a greater evil to do than to suffer injustice.

Compare the New Testament--

'It is better to suffer for well doing than for evil doing.'--1 Pet.

And the Sermon on the Mount--

'Blessed are they that are persecuted for righteousness' sake.'--Matt.

The words of Socrates are more abstract than the words of Christ, but
they equally imply that the only real evil is moral evil. The righteous
may suffer or die, but they have their reward; and even if they had
no reward, would be happier than the wicked. The world, represented by
Polus, is ready, when they are asked, to acknowledge that injustice is
dishonourable, and for their own sakes men are willing to punish
the offender (compare Republic). But they are not equally willing to
acknowledge that injustice, even if successful, is essentially evil,
and has the nature of disease and death. Especially when crimes
are committed on the great scale--the crimes of tyrants, ancient or
modern--after a while, seeing that they cannot be undone, and have
become a part of history, mankind are disposed to forgive them, not from
any magnanimity or charity, but because their feelings are blunted by
time, and 'to forgive is convenient to them.' The tangle of good and
evil can no longer be unravelled; and although they know that the end
cannot justify the means, they feel also that good has often come out
of evil. But Socrates would have us pass the same judgment on the tyrant
now and always; tho