ife's point of view." The English
reviewer here adds that "since no treatment can be worse nor any
insult grosser than open inconstancy on the part of a husband, it is
conceivable that a judge might consider that such conduct renders
living together impracticable. But in the presence of an explicit
provision with regard to the wife's adultery and in the absence of any
such provision with regard to the husband's, we doubt whether any
court of law would exercise discretion in favor of the woman." The
gross "insult of inconstancy" on the part of the husband is a plea
that has never yet been recognized by Japanese society. The reviewer
goes on to say: "One cannot help wishing that the peculiar code of
morality observed by husbands in this country had received some
condemnation at the hands of the framers of the new Code. It is
further laid down that a 'person who is judicially divorced or
punished because of adultery cannot contract a marriage with the other
party to the adultery.' If that extended to the husband it would be an
excellent provision, well calculated to correct one of the worst
social abuses of this country. Unfortunately, as we have seen, it
applies apparently to the case of the wife only." The provision for
divorce by "mutual consent" is striking and ominous. It makes divorce
a matter of entirely private arrangement, unless one of the parties
objects. In a land where women are so docile, is it likely that the
wife would refuse to consent to divorce when her lord and master
requests or commands her to leave his home? "There are not many women
in Japan who could refuse to become a party to the 'mutual consent'
arrangement if they were convinced that they had lost their husband's
affection and that he could not live comfortably with them." It would
appear that nothing whatever is said by the Code with reference to
concubinage, either allowing or forbidding it. Presumably a man may
have but one legitimate wife, and children by concubines must be
registered as illegitimate. Nothing, however, on this point seems to
be stated, although provision is made for the public acknowledgment of
illegitimate children. "Thus, a father can acknowledge a natural
child, making what is called a 'shoshi,' and if, subsequent to
acknowledgment, the father and mother marry, the 'shoshi,' acquires
the status of a legitimate child, such status reckoning back,
apparently to the time of birth." Evidently, this provision rests on
the impl