agining power does
not extend beyond the possibility of real existence or perception. Hence,
as it is impossible for me to see or feel anything without an actual
sensation of that thing, so is it impossible for me to conceive in my
thoughts any sensible thing or object distinct from the sensation or
perception of it.[Note.]
[Note: "In truth the object and the sensation are the same thing, and
cannot therefore be abstracted from each other--Edit 1710."]
6. Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need
only open his eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be,
viz., that all the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word
all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not
any subsistence without a mind, that their BEING (ESSE) is to be perceived
or known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by
me, or do not exist in my mind or that of any other CREATED SPIRIT, they
must either have no existence at all, OR ELSE SUBSIST IN THE MIND OF SOME
ETERNAL SPIRIT--it being perfectly unintelligible, and involving all the
absurdity of abstraction, to attribute to any single part of them an
existence independent of a spirit [Note.]. To be convinced of which, the
reader need only reflect, and try to separate in his own thoughts the
being of a sensible thing from its being perceived.
[Note: "To make this appear with all the light and evidence of an axiom,
it seems sufficient if I can but awaken the reflection of the reader,
that he may take an impartial view of his own meaning, and in turn his
thoughts upon the subject itself, free and disengaged from all embarrass
of words and prepossession in favour of received mistakes."--Edit 1710]
7. SECOND ARGUMENT.[Note.]--From what has been said it follows there is
NOT ANY OTHER SUBSTANCE THAN SPIRIT, or that which perceives. But, for the
fuller proof of this point, let it be considered the sensible qualities
are colour, figure, motion, smell, taste, etc., i.e. the ideas perceived
by sense. Now, for an idea to exist in an unperceiving thing is a
manifest contradiction, for TO HAVE AN IDEA IS ALL ONE AS TO PERCEIVE;
that therefore wherein colour, figure, and the like qualities exist must
perceive them; hence it is clear there can be no UNTHINKING substance or
SUBSTRATUM of those ideas.
[Note: Vide sect. iii. and xxv.]
8. OBJECTION.--ANSWER.--But, say you, though the ideas themselves do not
exist w
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