ith it, and are therefore inclined, since
the thing itself is indefensible, at least to retain the name, which we
apply to I know not what abstracted and indefinite notions of being, or
occasion, though without any show of reason, at least so far as I can
see. For, what is there on our part, or what do we perceive, amongst all
the ideas, sensations, notions which are imprinted on our minds, either
by sense or reflexion, from whence may be inferred the existence of an
inert, thoughtless, unperceived occasion? and, on the other hand, on the
part of an All-sufficient Spirit, what can there be that should make us
believe or even suspect He is directed by an inert occasion to excite
ideas in our minds?

75. ABSURDITY OF CONTENDING FOR THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER AS THE OCCASION
OF IDEAS.--It is a very extraordinary instance of the force of prejudice,
and much to be lamented, that the mind of man retains so great a fondness,
against all the evidence of reason, for a stupid thoughtless somewhat, by
the interposition whereof it would as it were screen itself from the
Providence of God, and remove it farther off from the affairs of the
world. But, though we do the utmost we can to secure the belief of
Matter, though, when reason forsakes us, we endeavour to support our
opinion on the bare possibility of the thing, and though we indulge
ourselves in the full scope of an imagination not regulated by reason to
make out that poor possibility, yet the upshot of all is, that there are
certain unknown Ideas in the mind of God; for this, if anything, is all
that I conceive to be meant by occasion with regard to God. And this at
the bottom is no longer contending for the thing, but for the name.

76. Whether therefore there are such Ideas in the mind of God, and
whether they may be called by the name Matter, I shall not dispute. But,
if you stick to the notion of an unthinking substance or support of
extension, motion, and other sensible qualities, then to me it is most
evidently impossible there should be any such thing, since it is a plain
repugnancy that those qualities should exist in or be supported by an
unperceiving substance.

77. THAT A SUBSTRATUM NOT PERCEIVED, MAY EXIST, UNIMPORTANT.--But,
say you, though it be granted that there is no thoughtless support
of extension and the other qualities or accidents which we perceive,
yet there may perhaps be some inert, unperceiving substance or
substratum of some other qualities, as incom