xactly in his friend's vein, that--there you are!

His aim was to explain the nature of those war powers of the government
"which lie dormant during time of peace," and therefore he frankly put
the question, "Is Congress the government?" Senator Fessenden, echoing
Stevens had said, "There is no limit on the powers of Congress;
everything must yield to the force of martial law as resolved by
Congress." "There, sir," said Browning, "is as broad and deep a
foundation for absolute despotism as was ever laid." He rang the changes
on the need to "protect minorities from the oppression and tyranny of
excited majorities."

He went on to lay the basis of all Lincoln's subsequent defense of
the presidential theory as opposed to the congressional theory, by
formulating two propositions which reappear in some of Lincoln's most
famous papers. Congress is not a safe vessel for extraordinary powers,
because in our system we have difficulty in bringing it definitely to an
account under any sort of plebiscite. On the other hand the President,
if he abuses the war powers "when peace returns, is answerable to the
civil power for that abuse."

But Browning was not content to reason on generalities. Asserting that
Congress could no more command the army than it could adjudicate a case,
he further asserted that the Supreme Court had settled the matter and
had lodged the war powers in the President. He cited a decision called
forth by the legal question, "Can a Circuit Court of the United States
inquire whether a President had acted rightly in calling out the militia
of a State to suppress an insurrection?" "The elevated office of the
President," said the Court, "chosen as he is by the People of the United
States, and the high responsibility he could not fail to feel when
acting in a case of such moment, appear to furnish as strong safeguards
against the wilful abuse of power as human prudence and foresight could
well devise. At all events, it is conferred upon him by the Constitution
and the laws of the United States, and therefore, must be respected and
enforced in its judicial tribunals."(9)

Whether or not constitutional lawyers would agree with Browning in the
conclusion he drew from this decision, it was plainly the bed rock
of his thought. He believed that the President--whatever your mere
historian might have to say--was in point of fact the exponent of the
people as a whole, and therefore the proper vessel for the ultimate
rights