spoils he sought. He might have
reached Harrisburg, if such was his intention; and, at all events, he
would have plundered and destroyed in a single day, far more than was
lost at Winchester.

In the course of his testimony, General Schenck did not hesitate to say,
that if he had been left to his own judgment in the control of the
forces within his department, he would have concentrated them all at
Winchester, with the view to meet and check the contemplated advance of
Lee's rebel army, until the Army of the Potomac could have come forward
to his relief. Undoubtedly this disposition of his command would have
had a controlling influence on the rebel campaign of last summer, in
Maryland and Pennsylvania. The movements of both armies would have been
materially changed, and the result must have been modified accordingly.
The invasion of the loyal States might have been altogether prevented,
or it might have been rendered even more disastrous. Speculations of
this kind as to movements which could have been made, are not of much
value, inasmuch as they cannot alter the irrevocable past. Military
operations are subject to so many contingencies, that it is impossible
to conjecture with any certainty what results might have followed a
different plan of campaign. Yet there could be no improvement in
military science, and no benefit from disastrous experience, unless the
errors of any particular movement may be pointed out and freely
criticized. If General Schenck's idea had been adopted, and preparation
made at Winchester to meet the advance of Lee's army, the movements of
the Army of the Potomac would have been conformed to that arrangement,
with cooeperation between the scattered forces of the Middle Department
and those under command of General Hooker. The campaign would have been
in some measure under our control; whereas, in the actual circumstances,
the enemy passed without opposition, except at Winchester, into Maryland
and Pennsylvania, and selected his own field of operations. It was most
fortunate, though almost fortuitous, so far as our army was concerned,
that it had the good fortune to be posted as it was in the neighborhood
of Gettysburg, with Cemetery Hill as the centre of our line. General
Meade has all the credit and honor of having made the best disposition
of his army, and carried it into the engagement with all the advantages
of that magnificent position. But the selection of the battle ground was
not the res