as by no means so
disastrous as has been generally supposed. Out of 6,900 effective men
who marched from Winchester, a little more than 6,000 escaped the enemy,
and although scattered in different directions, were found to be on duty
when recently the subject was investigated by order of Major-General
Schenck.

Most extravagant representations have been made as to the loss of stores
and ammunition by this evacuation. But the inquiry has established that
a large part of the wagons had been previously sent away in safety, that
very few stores were on hand, and that the ammunition was nearly
exhausted. The horses were all taken on the retreat, and notwithstanding
some confusion and disorder among the teamsters, were mostly saved to
the Government. The guns left in the fortifications, and the empty
wagons, constituted the principal loss; and these, in comparison with
amounts of public property which during the war have been abandoned at
many other places, without comment or complaint, were truly
insignificant.

In estimating this affair, it cannot be fairly characterized as either
disgraceful or particularly disastrous. The movements of Lee's army were
wholly unknown in advance either to General Schenck, or to the
General-in-chief of the army. The little force at Winchester, without
any warning, was called upon to encounter the advance of Lee's army in
overwhelming numbers. Without at first knowing or suspecting the
character of the enemy, General Milroy held this gathering force at bay
and in check for three days; and when finally surrounded and compelled
to cut his way out, did so with a loss of less than one thousand of his
effective men, of which number the killed and wounded were
inconsiderable. It is known from our paroled officers, that during the
investment and retreat, the enemy lost at least three hundred killed,
and seven hundred wounded, while our casualties were not one fourth of
that number.

Lee's army having escaped the army of the Potomac, was on its way to
Pennsylvania. This check and delay of its onward march was important in
its results. It was the first obstacle met by the invading host. It
served to reveal the movements and the concealed purpose of the enemy,
and enabled our army to pursue and counteract his designs. Had there
been no such obstacle, the rebel army would have swept on unopposed into
Maryland, and would have had three, or at least two more days of
unobstructed license to revel in the