roblems would have been easier of solution. But Maubeuge held out until
September 7, 1914, and by that time the prime results of the battles of
the Marne had been achieved. To this problem Verdun was the key, for
from Metz through Verdun ran the main line, less than one-half the
length of line to the Belgian bases of supplies, and, owing to the
nature of the country, a line that could be held with a quarter the
number of men. But Verdun stood, and General Joffre held the two armies
back to back, converging on the point at Verdun.

Such was the country over which the battles of the Marne were fought,
such were the numbers and dispositions of the several armies on each
side, and such, as far as can be judged, were the plans and counterplans
of the strategic leaders in the great conflict.

CHAPTER XIV

FIRST MOVES IN THE BATTLE

The first movement in this concerted plan was taken by the German
extreme right. This was the closing in of General von Kluck's army in a
southeasterly direction. It was a hazardous move, for it required
General von Kluck to execute a flank march diagonally across the front
of the Sixth French Army and the British Expeditionary Force. At this
time, according to the dispatches from Sir John French, the British army
lay south of the Marne between Lagny and Signy-Signets, defending the
passage of the river and blowing up the bridges before General von
Kluck.

On September 4, 1914, air reconnaissances showed that General von Kluck
had stopped his southward advance upon Paris, and that his columns were
moving in a southeasterly direction east of a line drawn through
Nanteuil and Lizy on the Ourcq. Meanwhile the French and British
generals more effectually concealed their armies in the forests, doing
so with such skill that their movements were unmarked by the German air
scouts. All that day General von Kluck moved his forces, leaving his
heavy artillery with about 100,000 men on the steep eastern bank of the
Ourcq and taking 150,000 troops south across the Marne toward La Ferte
Gaucher. He crossed the Petit Morin and the Grand Morin, all unconscious
that scores of field glasses were trained upon his troops.

Probably believing that the British army had been hurried to the aid of
General Sarrail, General von Kluck advanced confidently. Having
concealment in view, the commanders of the French army and the British
army between them had left a wide gap between the two armies. Through
one of t