the cathedral at Rheims and about all the churches and castles of France
which have shared its fate. These things do not interest us."

Opinions have differed concerning Von Ditfurth's appraisal of the
comparative values of Rheims Cathedral and the tombstone of a German
grenadier, but even the champions of military necessity were glad to
learn later that the cathedral still stood, though much damaged. There
was military excuse for the bombardment of the city of Rheims. But the
cathedral was by far the most conspicuous object in the Rheims
landscape. It was optional with the Germans to spare it except for some
casual shell that missed its aim. On the contrary they chose the great
church as a special target, as evidenced by repeated damage to the
cathedral and by the destruction of buildings all about it by shell
fire. This was certainly not military necessity, though the city of
Rheims had a place in the new strategical plan developed by Field
Marshal von Heeringen upon the collapse of the drive on Paris, which was
foiled by the battles of the Marne.

CHAPTER XXIII

SECOND PHASE OF BATTLE OF THE AISNE

The second phase of the battle of the Aisne contained two factors. One,
the simplest, was the maintenance of that line of defense against any
force that could be brought up against it by the Allies. It meant the
ability to hold strongly fortified positions against all odds. The
history of the trenches that winter, of which more will be said later,
reveals the extent to which the Germans succeeded, aided by the iron
craft of the old Prussian fighter General von Zwehl.

The other factor depended on the vexed question of means of
communication. There was no cross-country railway linking the eastern
German wing to the western German wing. As has been previously remarked,
all supplies and munitions had to come in a roundabout way. Verdun was a
desired goal, but Field Marshal von Heeringen was wise enough to know
that if the crown prince's effort against General Sarrail had failed, if
the Third French Army had secured heavy reenforcement, and if it had
been left unmolested for a week, the outer ring of defenses around
Verdun would, by that time, have become so amazingly strengthened that
direct or frontal attack would be impossible, while the flanking attack
had failed. It was vain, therefore, at the present time, to hope that
the establishment of the direct communication between Metz and Verdun
might pass into the