hands of the invaders.
On the other hand, there was a direct line of railway running through
Rheims, Rethel, Mezieres to the great war depot, Coblenz on the Rhine. A
branch line from Metz, through Luxemburg, thus gave communication to the
eastern wing. All the links of this were in German hands, except Rheims,
and if that railroad center could be secured, the importance to the
German advance would be enormous. Under such circumstances, it can
scarcely be held that Rheims was not necessarily a point, the attack of
which was due to military necessity.
The formation for this began on September 17, 1914. Crossing the Aisne
by the old ford of Berry-au-Bac, a powerful army under the direct
leadership of Field Marshal von Heeringen debouched upon the open
country between Berry-au-Bac and Suippes, east of Rheims. It was at this
point that the German commander in chief of this section of the battle
line intended to deliver a crushing blow by which might be regained the
prestige secured at Charleroi and lost again at the Marne.
Surprise may be felt that so important a railway center as Rheims should
not have been a strongly fortified place. It had been so once, though
the fortifications were old-fashioned. But, instead of bringing these
points of natural defense up to the highest degree of modern efficiency,
the French had dismantled them entirely, so as to make Rheims with its
glorious cathedral an open town, safe from bombardment. It was,
according to the rules of war, safe from bombardment, but only in the
event of its not being defended. General Foch did not dare to take this
stand. He knew, as well as did General von Heeringen, the strategic
value of Rheims as railroad center, and accepted the issue of battle.
In the falling back of the several German armies from the Marne to the
Aisne, the Germans had kept possession of the chief forts of the
district around Rheims. No strong effort had been made to dislodge them,
for the forward movement of the Allies had been directed against the
fortified heights of the Aisne, facing the Soissons-Craonne defense. It
will be remembered that the armies of General Foch and Langle,
especially the latter, had taken no part in the first phase of the
Battle of the Aisne, but had stubbornly thrown back the armies of the
Duke of Wuerttemberg, which had combined with those of the crown prince.
The right wing of this large conjoined army had held the fort sites
around Rheims and especially t
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