ng reenforcements therefrom to the
army of General Sarrail, on which the whole force of the army of the
crown prince was to be hurled.

The next section of the Allied armies, then, was General Foch's Ninth
Army, which encountered the German drive at Fere Champenoise, and which
resulted in the severe handling of General von Buelow's forces. With
characteristic perception of the difference between a greater and a
lesser encounter, General Foch called his share of the battles of the
Marne, the "Affair of the Marshes of St. Gond." This did not culminate
until Wednesday, September 9, 1914, so that the German retreat there was
one day later than the final retreat of General von Kluck.

The clash between the armies of General von Buelow and of General Foch
began, as did the battle wrath along the whole front, at dawn of that
fateful Sunday, September 5, 1914. General Foch, a well-known writer on
strategy, had devised his army for defense. He was well supplied with
the famous 75-millimeter guns, holding them massed in the center of his
line. His extreme right and left were mobile and thrown partly forward
to feel the attack of the invading army. But, in spite of all
preparations, General Foch found himself hard-set to hold his own on
September 5, 6, 7, and 8, 1914. The battle continued incessantly, by
night as well as by day, for the artillerists had found each other's
range. There was comparatively little hand-to-hand fighting at this
point, General Foch only once being successful in luring the Germans to
within close firing range. The results were withering, and General von
Buelow did not attempt it a second time. There seems reason to believe
that General von Buelow had counted upon acting as a reserve force to
General von Kluck during the latter's advance, and that, consequently,
he did not think it prudent to risk heavy loss of life until he knew the
situation to westward of him. There was some sharp "bomb" work at Fere
Champenoise on September 8, and then came the night of the 8th.

It will be remembered that at the close of the battle of Montmirail on
the evening of September 8, 1914, the western flank of Von Buelow's army
had been exposed by the advance of General d'Esperey and the retreat of
General von Kluck. Information of this reached Foch, and despite the
danger of the maneuver, he thrust out his mobile left like a great
tongue. That night the weather turned stormy, facilitating this move. At
one o'clock in the m