vs. Thus the extreme Southern Slav elements, in
their widest demands, are more moderate than the moderate Italians in
their most limited programme. "Without distinction of tribe or creed,"
says that Edinburgh reviewer, "all the Yugoslavs are waiting for their
1870. This will fix and perpetuate their unity.... The preparation is
going forward silently--almost sullenly--and without demur or
qualification the Yugoslavs are accepting the Serb military chiefs'
guidance and domination." He was much impressed by the silence and
controlled power of the Serbian General Staff. There was in Europe a
general war-weariness; but not in Yugoslavia. There was a hush in this
part of Europe, broken only by the shrill screams of Italian
propagandists and outbursts of suppressed passion on the other side.
THE BELATED TREATY OF RAPALLO
And the Rapallo Treaty of November 1920, when at last the statesmen of
Italy and Yugoslavia came to terms regarding all their frontiers! This
Treaty was received with much applause by the great majority of the
French and British Press; in this country of compromise it was pointed
out by many that as each party knew that the other had abated something
of his desires the Treaty would probably remain in operation for a long
time to come. And column after column of smug comment was written in
various newspapers by the "Diplomatic Correspondent," whose knowledge of
diplomacy may have been greater than his acquaintance with the Adriatic,
since they followed one another, like a procession of sheep, in copying
the mistake in a telegram which spoke of Eritto, the curious suburb of
Zadar, instead of Borgo Erizzo. They noted that each side had yielded
something, though it was true that the Yugoslavs had been the more
generous in surrendering half a million of their compatriots, whereas
the Italians had given up Dalmatia, to which they never had any
right.[58] "The claim for Dalmatia was entirely unjustified," said
Signor Colajanni in the Italian Chamber on November 23--yet it was not
our business to weigh the profit and loss to the two interested parties.
After all, it was they who had between themselves made this Agreement,
and one might argue that it surely would be an impertinence if anybody
else was more royalist than the king. These commentators held that it
was inexpedient for anyone to ask why the Yugoslavs should now have
accepted conditions that were, on the whole, considerably worse than
those which Presi
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