les respectively see Arist. "Lysistr." 563; "Anab." III.
iv. 15; VI. VII. passim.

Between wisdom and sobriety of soul (which is temperance) he drew no
distinction. (3) Was a man able on the one hand to recognise things
beautiful and good sufficiently to live in them? Had he, on the other
hand, knowledge of the "base and foul" so as to beware of them? If so,
Socrates judged him to be wise at once and sound of soul (or temperate).
(4)

(3) But cf. IV. vi. 7; K. Joel, op. cit. p. 363.

(4) Reading {alla to... kai to}, or more lit. "he discovered the
wise man and sound of soul in his power not only to recognise
things 'beautiful and good,' but to live and move and have his
being in them; as also in his gift of avoiding consciously things
base." Or if {alla ton... kai ton...} transl. "The man who
not only could recognise the beautiful and good, but lived, etc.,
in that world, and who moreover consciously avoided things base, in
the judgment of Socrates was wise and sound of soul." Cf. Plat.
"Charm."

And being further questioned whether "he considered those who have
the knowledge of right action, but do not apply it, to be wise and
self-controlled?"--"Not a whit more," he answered, "than I consider them
to be unwise and intemperate. (5) Every one, I conceive, deliberately
chooses what, within the limits open to him, he considers most conducive
to his interest, and acts accordingly. I must hold therefore that
those who act against rule and crookedly (6) are neither wise nor
self-controlled.

(5) For the phrase "not a whit the more" see below, III. xii. 1;
"Econ." xii. 18. Al. "I should by no means choose to consider them
wise and self-controlled rather than foolish and intemperate."

(6) "Who cannot draw a straight line, ethically speaking."

He said that justice, moreover, and all other virtue is wisdom. That is
to say, things just, and all things else that are done with virtue,
are "beautiful and good"; and neither will those who know these things
deliberately choose aught else in their stead, nor will he who lacks the
special knowledge of them be able to do them, but even if he makes the
attempt he will miss the mark and fail. So the wise alone can perform
the things which are "beautiful and good"; they that are unwise cannot,
but even if they try they fail. Therefore, since all things just, and
generally all things "beautiful and good," are wrought with virtue, it