loose ends as they were: in a short time he was transferred at his own
suggestion to an easier station in the Pyrenees, it being understood
that Dugommier, a professional soldier, would be finally appointed
commander-in-chief, and that Duteil, the brother of Buonaparte's old
friend and commander, was to be made general of artillery. He was a
man advanced in years, unable even to mount a horse: but he was
devoted to the young captain, trusted his powers, and left him in
virtual command. Abundant supplies arrived at the same time from
Lyons. On November twentieth the new officers took charge, two days
later a general reconnaissance was made, and within a short time the
investment was completed. On the thirtieth there was a formidable
sally from the town directed against Buonaparte's batteries. In the
force were two thousand three hundred and fifty men: about four
hundred British, three hundred Sardinians, two hundred and fifty
French, and seven hundred each of Neapolitans and Spanish. They were
commanded by General Dundas. Their earliest movements were successful
and the commander-in-chief of the besieged came out to see the
victory. But the tide turned, the French revolutionists rallied, and
the sortie was repulsed. The event was made doubly important by the
chance capture of General O'Hara, the English commandant. Such a
capture is rare,--Buonaparte was profoundly impressed by the fact. He
obtained permission to visit the English general in captivity, but was
coldly received. To the question: "What do you require?" came the curt
reply: "To be left alone and owe nothing to pity." This striking
though uncourtly reply delighted Buonaparte. The success was duly
reported to Paris. In the "Moniteur" of December seventh the name of
Buona Parte is mentioned for the first time, and as among the most
distinguished in the action.
The councils of war before Dugommier's arrival had been numerous and
turbulent, although the solitary plan of operations suggested by the
commander and his aides would have been adequate only for capturing an
inland town, and probably not even for that. From the beginning and
with fierce iteration Buonaparte had explained to his colleagues the
special features of their task, but all in vain. He reasoned that
Toulon depended for its resisting power on the Allies and their
fleets, and must be reduced from the side next the sea. The English
themselves understood this when they seized and fortified the redou
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