pose of increasing
the army's strength and perfecting its organization is not certainly
known, but it must be admitted on his own testimony that he belonged to
the coterie of officers who fully trusted and supported McClellan in
the determination to make complete preparation before moving against
the enemy. Nor is it known what part he took in the selection of the
line of operations ultimately adopted by McClellan for the capture of
Richmond. Perhaps this is not important, for neither the duty nor the
responsibility of the choice was his. It is not likely, however, that
he was consulted for his acquaintance with McClellan was not at first
close or intimate. At a later period he joined his friend General
Franklin, then generally acknowledged as one of the leading military
men of the day, in a letter to the President recommending the transfer
of the Army of the Potomac from the vicinity of Fredericksburg to the
James River, as near to Richmond as practicable, and urging its
reinforcement by all the troops that could be gathered from the
departments of the Atlantic seaboard. Without discussing here the
origin or the wisdom of this controverted proposition, it may be
remarked that it was supported by such an array of arguments and
influence as would doubtless have secured another trial for it, even in
the face of its failure under McClellan, had the condition and strength
of the army, and the resources of the country been considered by the
administration sufficient to meet all the requirements of the civil and
military situation.

At a still later period after General Grant had come to the head of
military affairs, had decided to take personal charge of operations in
Virginia, and was seriously considering the appointment of General
Smith to the immediate command of the Army of the Potomac, it became
known to me, through a letter from the latter, that he strongly favored
a "powerful movement from the lower James River, or even from the
sounds of North Carolina" against the interior of the Confederacy. I
was at that time serving in Washington, as the Chief of the Cavalry
Bureau, and upon receipt of the letter laid it before General Rawlins,
Grant's able Chief of Staff, but without giving it my concurrence or
approval, for such consideration as he might think best to give it. It
was received at a juncture when the selection of a proper plan of
operations was conceded to be a matter of the gravest importance. It is
an interes