he
generalissimo, had neither the time nor opportunity to gather the
facts. He was neither an engineer nor strange as it may seem, a close
calculator of the chances.

He necessarily depended upon the Chief Engineer, and the criticism
which was sure to come from others, to gather and sift the data upon
which final action must be based. Thomas was there from the first,
able, methodical and invincible, a great field tactician, but not
specially distinguished for his knowledge of engineering, grand tactics
or strategy. Sherman came afterwards. He was bold, active and
energetic, and had a fine eye for topography. He knew as well as anyone
what could be done and what could not be done by an army, but he came
too late to take part in the original investigations, or to do anything
more than to accept the part assigned to him, and from an examination
of the ground say whether or not he could carry it out. The important
fact is that Smith was, beyond any question, the first mind among them
all for working out just such problems as confronted the leaders of the
Union army at Chattanooga, and that task was by common consent assigned
to him. The responsibility was Grant's. His judgment and resolution
must necessarily decide and execute, but it was Smith's place to gather
the facts and work out the details of one of the most complicated
military problems that was ever presented for solution, and it can
hardly be too much to say that he discharged his task with such
patience, skill and success as to justly entitle himself to be known in
history as the Strategist of Chattanooga. Were his distinguished
associates living, it cannot be doubted they would willingly concede
that honor to him. In their official reports and correspondence at the
time they went far beyond the usual limit to give him praise, and
although Grant finally withdrew his friendship from him, for reasons
which will be given hereafter, he never in the slightest degree
withdrew or modified the praise he had awarded him for his services in
the Chattanooga campaign.

But to return to the details of the plan of operations. It was Smith
who discovered the possibility of turning Bragg's position on
Missionary Ridge, by the Army of the Tennessee. After personal
examination of the lay of the ground he suggested that Sherman's army
coming up from Bridgeport through Lookout Valley should cross to the
north side of the Tennessee by the bridge at Brown's Ferry, and after
passing