garded as an
afterthought which had its origin in some cause not yet fully
explained.

It is altogether likely that Smith's criticism was repeated to others
less entitled to speak than himself and that it was exaggerated into a
direct attack upon both Meade and Grant, which could not be passed over
lightly. Be this as it may, it must be apparent that it was fully
justified as a mere matter of military criticism and quite independent
of both Smith and Upton, it was generally approved both by the army and
the country at large.

It was shortly after the assault in question, while I was commanding a
division of cavalry, that I visited Grant's headquarters. During the
conversation which followed the Lieutenant General asked me: "What is
the matter with this army?" To which I replied:

"It will take too long to explain, but I can tell you how to
cure it. Give Parker [the Indian Chief] a tomahawk, a supply
of commissary whiskey and a scalping knife and send him out
with orders to bring in the scalps of general officers."

During this same visit and frequently afterwards Rawlins, in a white
rage, inveighed against the desperate practice of blindly assaulting
fortified lines, and denounced in unmeasured terms all who favored them
or failed to make adequate preparation for success, where any just
excuse could be found for resorting to them. It is worthy of remark,
without reference to the origin of the practice, or to the persons who
were responsible for it, that General Grant alone had the power to stop
it, and that later there was a noticeable change in the Army of the
Potomac in regard to that practice, although it should be noted that
Sherman followed it as an example in his desperate, but unsuccessful
assault of the enemy's impregnable fortifications on Kenesaw Mountain,
for the purpose, as he frankly explained, of showing that his army
could also assault strongly fortified lines.

That such a costly practice could spring up and obtain imitation in our
army is a striking commentary upon the lack of intelligent supervision
over the essential details of its daily operations. It affords ample
justification for again calling attention to the fact that in this
respect the Confederate Army was much better off and more fortunate
than the Union Army. Its generals, although not without fault, were
much more careful in the management of their military details than ours
were. Jefferson Davis was himself an edu