ually chaotic
situation. After this negative work is completed, the constructive
rebuilding of China can proceed only by utilizing local interests and
abilities. In China the movement will be the opposite of that which
occurred in Japan. It will be from the periphery to the centre.

Another objection to the present tendency has force especially from
the foreign standpoint. As already stated, the efforts of the Manchu
dynasty in its latter days to enhance central power were due to
international pressure. Foreign nations treated Peking as if it were a
capital like London, Paris or Berlin, and in its efforts to meet
foreign demands it had to try to become such a centre. The result was
disaster. But foreign nations still want to have a single centre which
may be held responsible. And subconsciously, if not consciously, this
desire is responsible for much of the objection of foreign nationals
to the local autonomy movement. They well know that it is going to
take a long time to realize the ideal of federation, and meantime
where and what is to be the agency responsible for diplomatic
relations, the enforcing of indemnities and the securing of
concessions?

In one respect the secessionist tendency is dangerous to China herself
as well as inconvenient to the powers. It will readily stimulate the
desire and ability of foreign nations to interfere in China's domestic
affairs. There will be many centres at which to carry on intrigues and
from which to get concessions instead of one or two. There is also
danger that one foreign nation may line up with one group of
provinces, and another foreign nation with another group, so that
international friction will increase. Even now some Japanese sources
and even such an independent liberal paper as Robert Young's Japan
Chronicle are starting or reporting the rumor that the Cantonese
experiment is supported by subsidies supplied by American capitalists
in the hope of economic concessions. The rumor was invented for a
sinister purpose. But it illustrates the sort of situation that may
come into existence if there are several political centres in China
and one foreign nation backs one and another nation, another.

The danger is real enough. But it cannot be dealt with by attempting
the impossible--namely checking the movement toward local autonomy,
even though disintegration may temporarily accompany it. The danger
only emphasizes the fundamental fact of the whole Chinese situation;
tha