h the troops.

[4] This rested on Chatterton's Hill, some distance in front of the main
line. Not having intrenched, the defenders were overpowered, though not
until after making a sharp fight.

[5] An excellent account of the operations at Fort Washington will be
found in Graydon's _Memoirs_, p. 197 _et seq._

[6] Lieut. Martin Hunter, of the Fifty-second Foot.

V

THE SITUATION REVIEWED

[Sidenote: The new situation.]

The dilemma now confronting Washington was hydra-headed. Either way it
was serious. On one side New England lay open to the enemy, on the other
New Jersey. And an advance was also threatened from the North. If he
stayed where he was, the enemy would overrun New Jersey at will. Should
he move his army into New Jersey, Howe could easily cut off its
communications with New England, the chief resource for men and
munitions. Of course this was not to be thought of. On the other hand,
the conquest of New Jersey, with Philadelphia as the ultimate prize, in
all probability would be Howe's next object. At the present moment there
was nothing to prevent his marching to Philadelphia, arms at ease. To
think of fighting in the open field was sheer folly. And there was not
one fortified position between the Hudson and the Delaware where the
enemy's triumphal march might be stayed.

Forced by these adverse circumstances to attempt much more than twice
his present force would have encouraged the hope of doing successfully,
Washington decided that he must place himself between the enemy and
Philadelphia, and at the same time hold fast to his communications with
New England and the upper Hudson. This could only be done by dividing
his greatly weakened forces into two corps, one of which should attempt
the difficult task of checking the enemy in the Jerseys, while the other
held a strong position on the Hudson, until Howe's purposes should be
more fully developed. With Washington it was no longer a choice of
evils, but a stern obedience to imperative necessity.

[Sidenote: The army divided.]

[Sidenote: Washington in New Jersey.]

Lee was now put in command of the corps left to watch Howe's movement
east of the Hudson, loosely estimated at 5,000 men, and ordered back
behind the Croton. Heath, with 2,000 men of his division, was ordered to
Peekskill, to guard the passes of the Highlands, these two corps being
thus posted within supporting distance. With the other corps of 4,000
men Washington crossed