the attack unflinchingly. This force being all assembled on
the 1st of January, 1777, Washington posted it on the east side of the
Assanpink, behind the bridge over which Rail's soldiers had made good
their retreat on the day of the surprise, with some thirty guns planted
in his front to defend the crossing. Washington and Rall had thus
suddenly changed places.

[Sidenote: His position, Jan. 2, 1777.]

The American position was strong except on the right. It being higher
ground the artillery commanded the town, the Assanpink was not fordable
in front, the bridge was narrow, and the left secured by the Delaware.
The weak spot, the right, rested in a wood which was strongly held, and
capable of a good defence; but inasmuch as the Assanpink could be forded
two or three miles higher up, a movement to the right and rear of the
position was greatly to be feared. If successful it would necessarily
cut off all retreat, as the Delaware was now impassable.

On the 2d the enemy's advance came upon the American pickets posted
outside of Trenton, driving them through the town much in the same
manner as they had driven the Hessians. As soon as the enemy came within
range, the American artillery drove them back under cover, firing being
kept up until dark.

Having thus developed the American position, Cornwallis, astonished at
Washington's temerity in taking it, felt sure of "bagging the fox," as
he styled it, in the morning.

The night came. The soldiers slept, but Washington, alive to the danger,
summoned his generals in council. All were agreed that a battle would be
forced upon them with the dawn of day--all that the upper fords could
not be defended. And if they were passed, the event of battle would be
beyond all doubt disastrous. Cornwallis had only to hold Washington's
attention in front while turning his flank. Should, then, the patriot
army endeavor to extricate itself by falling back down the river? There
seems to have been but one opinion as to the futility of the attempt,
inasmuch as there was no stronger position to fall back upon. As a
choice of evils, it was much better to remain where they were than be
forced into making a disorderly retreat while looking for some other
place to fight in.

Who, then, was responsible for putting the army into a position where it
could neither fight nor retreat? If neither of these things could be
done with any hope of success, there remained, in point of fact, but one
alternativ