erred to New York and its environs.
There is no need to discuss the general proposition, so quickly accepted
by both belligerents, as regards the strategic value of New York for
combined operations by land and sea. Hence the Americans were naturally
unwilling to abandon it to the enemy. A successful defence was really
beyond their abilities, however, against such a powerful fleet as was
now coming to attack them, because this fleet could not be prevented
from forcing its way into the upper bay without strong fortifications at
the Narrows to stop it, and these the Americans did not have. Once in
possession of the navigable waters, the enemy could cut off
communication in every direction, as well as choose his own point of
attack. Afraid, however, of the moral effect of giving up the city
without a struggle, the Americans were led into the fatal error of
squandering their resources upon a defence which could end only in one
way, instead of holding the royal army besieged, as had been so
successfully done at Boston.
Having arrived at New York, Washington's force was increased by the two
or three thousand men who had been hastily summoned for its defence,[4]
and who were then busily employed in throwing up works at various
points, under the direction of the engineers.
[Sidenote: Make-up of the army.]
Now, it is usual to call such a large body of raw recruits, badly armed,
and without discipline, an army, in the same breath as a well armed and
thoroughly disciplined body. This one had done good service behind
entrenchments, and in some minor operations at Boston had shown itself
possessed of the best material, but the situation was now to be wholly
reversed, the besiegers were to become the besieged, their mistakes were
to be turned against them, the experiments of inexperience were to be
tested at the risk of total failure, and the _morale_ severely tried by
the grumbling and discontent arising for the most part from laxity of
discipline, but somewhat so, too, from the wretched administration of
the various civil departments of the army.[5] The officers did not know
how to instruct their men, and the men could not be made to take proper
care of themselves. In consequence of this state of things, inseparable
perhaps from the existing conditions, General Heath tells us that by the
first week of August the number of sick amounted to near 10,000 men, who
were to be met with lying "in almost every barn, stable, shed, and
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