policy
look only to their immediate private interests, and pay no regard to
the vital needs of the members of the league. The alliance will not
regain its original strength until, under the protection of the allied
armies, each of the three States can satisfy its political needs. We
must therefore be solicitous to promote Austria's position in the
Balkans, and Italy's interests on the Mediterranean. Only then can we
calculate on finding in our allies assistance towards realizing our own
political endeavours. Since, however, it is against all our interests to
strengthen Italy at the cost of Turkey, which is, as we shall see, an
essential member of the Triple Alliance, we must repair the errors of
the past, and in the next great war win back Tunis for Italy. Only then
will Bismarck's great conception of the Triple Alliance reveal its real
meaning. But the Triple Alliance, so long as it only aims at negative
results, and leaves it to the individual allies to pursue their vital
interests exclusively by their own resources, will be smitten with
sterility. On the surface, Italy's Mediterranean interests do not
concern us closely. But their real importance for us is shown by the
consideration that the withdrawal of Italy from the Triple Alliance, or,
indeed, its secession to an Anglo-Franco-Russian _entente,_ would
probably be the signal for a great European war against us and Austria.
Such a development would gravely prejudice the lasting interests of
Italy, for she would forfeit her political independence by so doing, and
incur the risk of sinking to a sort of vassal state of France. Such a
contingency is not unthinkable, for, in judging the policy of Italy, we
must not disregard her relations with England as well as with France.
England is clearly a hindrance in the way of Italy's justifiable efforts
to win a prominent position in the Mediterranean. She possesses in
Gibraltar, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt, and Aden a chain of strong bases, which
secure the sea-route to India, and she has an unqualified interest in
commanding this great road through the Mediterranean. England's
Mediterranean fleet is correspondingly strong and would--especially in
combination with the French Mediterranean squadron--seriously menace the
coasts of Italy, should that country be entangled in a war against
England _and_ France. Italy is therefore obviously concerned in avoiding
such a war, as long as the balance of maritime power is unchanged. She
is th
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