in time and deceive an opponent, or when he cannot see what is the
trend of events. He will use such diplomatic means only as inferior
tools; in reality he will only reckon with actual forces and with the
powers of a continuous development.

We must make it quite clear to ourselves that there can be no standing
still, no being satisfied for us, but only progress or retrogression,
and that it is tantamount to retrogression when we are contented with
our present place among the nations of Europe, while all our rivals are
straining with desperate energy, even at the cost of our rights, to
extend their power. The process of our decay would set in gradually and
advance slowly so long as the struggle against us was waged with
peaceful weapons; the living generation would, perhaps, be able to
continue to exist in peace and comfort. But should a war be forced upon
us by stronger enemies under conditions unfavourable to us, then, if our
arms met with disaster, our political downfall would not be delayed, and
we should rapidly sink down. The future of German nationality would be
sacrificed, an independent German civilization would not long exist, and
the blessings for which German blood has flowed in streams--spiritual
and moral liberty, and the profound and lofty aspirations of German
thought--would for long ages be lost to mankind.

If, as is right, we do not wish to assume the responsibility for such a
catastrophe, we must have the courage to strive with every means to
attain that increase of power which we are entitled to claim, even at
the risk of a war with numerically superior foes.

Under present conditions it is out of the question to attempt this by
acquiring territory in Europe. The region in the East, where German
colonists once settled, is lost to us, and could only be recovered from
Russia by a long and victorious war, and would then be a perpetual
incitement to renewed wars. So, again, the reannexation of the former
South Prussia, which was united to Prussia on the second partition of
Poland, would be a serious undertaking, on account of the Polish
population.

Under these circumstances we must clearly try to strengthen our
political power in other ways.

In the first place, our political position would be considerably
consolidated if we could finally get rid of the standing danger that
France will attack us on a favourable occasion, so soon as we find
ourselves involved in complications elsewhere. In one way