and being
in nightly expectation of a repetition of the scene in Basque Roads; or
at least of that which little more than a year previous had been enacted
before Callao--every precaution was taken against surprise. He was
quite right in the conjecture as to what was intended; but did not
calculate--as I was obliged to do--on the general want of experience of
such matters in the Brazilian service.

Our preparations being, on the 8th of June, reported to be favourably
progressing, I determined to put the attack in execution so soon as the
tide flowed late enough in the evening to prevent the enemy from
perceiving us in time to disturb or defeat our operations. The
difficulty was to find competent persons to take charge of the
fireships, so as to kindle them at the proper moment--the want of which
had rendered most of the fireships ineffective--as such--in the affair
of Basque Roads in 1809, and had formed one of the principal obstacles
when attacking Callao in 1821. Of the explosion vessel I intended myself
to take charge, as I had formerly done in Basque Roads.

On the 9th of June information arrived that the enemy had resolved on an
attempt to destroy the fireships in the Moro San Paulo, and that the
second division of their army was being embarked in transports for that
purpose. Preparations were at once made to receive them by ordering in
the vessels scouring the coast, and by such other precautionary measures
as were necessary for the defence of that important station.

It was, however, difficult to make a proper defence, for, with the
exception of Portuguese--who could not be trusted--there were no
Artillerymen in the Brazilian squadron who had any practical knowledge
of their duty, even if the guns on the Moro could be made to contribute
to its defence, for the place was open, and commanded by heights, of
which, as we had no troops, the enemy could possess themselves by night
or by day. In case they did so, before adequate preparations could be
made, I directed the guns to be spiked, that they might not be turned
against the ships. No attack was, however, made, the enemy being
doubtless deterred by the apparent promptitude in anticipating their
movements.

On the 11th of June further information was received that the
contemplated attack on the Moro had been abandoned, and that the enemy
were seriously deliberating on evacuating the port before the fireships
were completed, I therefore ordered the _Maria de Glor