ncts do not extend to all the
individuals of the species, but only to those of the same community. As,
however, they are highly beneficial to the species, they have in all
probability been acquired through natural selection. In Darwin's
judgment the moral nature of man has reached its present standard partly
through the advancement of his reasoning powers, and consequently, of a
just public opinion, but especially from his sympathies having been
rendered more tender and widely diffused through the effects of habit,
example, instruction, and reflection. It is pronounced not improbable
that, after long practice, virtuous tendencies may be inherited.

Let us look a little more closely at the matter, for the difficulty of
explaining morality forms one of the greatest obstacles to the
acceptance of the Darwinian account of the descent of man. What do we
mean by a moral being? Manifestly, a moral being is one who is capable
of reflecting on his past actions and their motives, and of approving of
some while he disapproves of others. Man is the one being who certainly
deserves this designation, though attempts have recently been made to
show that a rudimentary morality may be traced in some of the lower
animals. In the fourth chapter of the book before us, Darwin undertakes
to demonstrate that the moral sense follows,--first, from the enduring
and ever-present nature of the social instincts; secondly, from man's
appreciation of the approbation and disapprobation of his fellows; and,
thirdly, from the high activity of his mental faculties, with past
impressions extremely vivid; in these latter respects he differs from
the lower animals. Owing to this condition of mind, man cannot avoid
looking both backwards and forwards, and comparing past impressions.
Hence, after some temporary desire or passion has mastered his social
instincts, he reflects and compares the now weakened impression of such
past impulses with the ever-present social instincts; and he then feels
that sense of dissatisfaction which all unsatisfied instincts leave
behind them, and resolves to act differently for the future. This
dissatisfaction Darwin would identify with conscience. Any instinct
permanently stronger or more enduring than another gives rise to a
feeling which we express by saying that it _ought_ to be obeyed. Darwin
suggests that a pointer dog, if able to reflect on his past conduct,
would say to himself I _ought_ (as indeed we say of him) to have