ieging Richmond
in due form, crawled cautiously about the intervening swamps of the
oozy Chickahominy. McDowell, who could not advance alone, remained
at Fredericksburg. Shields stood behind him, near Catlett's Station,
to keep another eye on nervous Washington.

In the meantime Stonewall Jackson, still in the Shenandoah, had
fought no battles since his tactical defeat at Kernstown on the
twenty-third of March had proved such a pregnant strategic victory
elsewhere. But late in April he had a letter from Lee, telling of
the general situation and suggesting an attack on Banks. Banks,
however, still had twenty thousand men at Harrisonburg, with twenty-five
thousand more in or within call of the Valley. Jackson's complete
grand total was less than eighteen thousand. The odds against him
therefore exceeded five against two; and direct attack was out of
the question. But he now began his maneuvers anew and on a bolder
scale than ever. He had upset the Federal strategy at Kernstown,
when there were less than eight thousand Confederates in the Valley.
What might he not do with ten thousand more? His wonderful Valley
Campaign, famous forever in the history of war, gives us the answer.

He had five advantages over Banks. First, his own expert knowledge
and genius for war, backed by a dauntless character. Banks was a
very able man who had worked his way up from factory hand to Speaker
of the House of Representatives and Governor of Massachusetts. But
he had neither the knowledge, genius, nor character required for
high command; and he owed his present position more to his ardor
as a politician than to his ability as a general. Jackson's second
advantage was his own and his army's knowledge of the country for
which they naturally fought with a loving zeal which no invaders could
equal. The third advantage was in having Turner Ashby's cavalry.
These were horsemen born and bred, who could make their way across
country as easily as the "footy" Federals could along the road.
In answer to a peremptory order a Federal cavalry commander could
only explain: "I can't catch them. They leap fences and walls like
deer. Neither our men nor our horses are so trained." The fourth
advantage was in discipline. Jackson habitually spared his men more
than his officers, and his officers more than himself, whenever
indulgence was possible. But when discipline had to be sternly
maintained he maintained it sternly, throughout all ranks, knowing
that