reduced it to almost nothing, leaving him only one frigate and a brig.
This was a fatal error. While the Austrian and Sardinian troops,
whether from the imbecility or the treachery of their leaders, remained
inactive, the French were preparing for the invasion of Italy. Not many
days before Nelson was thus summoned to Genoa, he chased a large convoy
into Alassio. Twelve vessels he had formerly destroyed in that port,
though 2000 French troops occupied the town. This former attack had made
them take new measures of defence; and there were now above 100 sail
of victuallers, gun-boats, and ships of war. Nelson represented to the
Admiral how important it was to destroy these vessels; and offered,
with his squadron of frigates, and the CULLODEN and COURAGEUX, to lead
himself in the AGAMEMNON, and take or destroy the whole. The attempt was
not permitted; but it was Nelson's belief that, if it had been made, it
would have prevented the attack upon the Austrian army, which took place
almost immediately afterwards.

General de Vins demanded satisfaction of the Genoese government for the
seizure of his commissary; and then, without waiting for their reply,
took possession of some empty magazines of the French, and pushed his
sentinels to the very gates of Genoa. Had he done so at first, he
would have found the magazines full; but, timed as the measure was, and
useless as it was to the cause of the allies, it was in character with
the whole of the Austrian general's conduct; and it is no small proof of
the dexterity with which he served the enemy, that in such circumstances
he could so act with Genoa as to contrive to put himself in the wrong.
Nelson was at this time, according to his own expression, placed in a
cleft stick. Mr. Drake, the Austrian minister, and the Austrian general,
all joined in requiring him not to leave Genoa; if he left that port
unguarded, they said, not only the imperial troops at St. Pier d'Arena
and Voltri would be lost, but the French plan for taking post between
Voltri and Savona would certainly succeed; if the Austrians should be
worsted in the advanced posts, the retreat of the Bocchetta would be cut
off; and if this happened, the loss of the army would be imputed to him,
for having left Genoa. On the other hand, he knew that if he were not
at Pietra, the enemy's gun-boats would harass the left flank of the
Austrians, who, if they were defeated, as was to be expected, from the
spirit of all their oper