ered a reward of 10,000 livres to
any pilot of the country who would carry the squadron in, but none could
be found who would venture to take charge of a single vessel drawing
more than twenty feet. He had therefore made the best of his situation,
and chosen the strongest position which he could possibly take in an
open road. The commissary of the fleet said they were moored in such a
manner as to bid defiance to a force more than double their own. This
presumption could not then be thought unreasonable. Admiral Barrington,
when moored in a similar manner off St. Lucia, in the year 1778, beat
off the Comte d'Estaign in three several attacks, though his force
was inferior by almost one-third to that which assailed it. Here, the
advantage in numbers, both in ships, guns, and men, was in favour of the
French. They had thirteen ships of the line and four frigates, carrying
1196 guns and 11,230 men. The English had the same number of ships of
the line and one fifty-gun ship, carrying 1012 guns and 8068 men. The
English ships were all seventy-fours; the French had three eighty-gun
ships, and one three-decker of one hundred and twenty.

During the whole pursuit it had been Nelson's practice, whenever
circumstances would permit, to have his captains on board the VANGUARD,
and explain to them his own ideas of the different and best modes of
attack, and such plans as he proposed to execute on falling in with the
enemy, whatever their situation might be. There is no possible position,
it is said, which he did not take into calculation. His officers were
thus fully acquainted with his principles of tactics; and such was his
confidence in their abilities that the only thing determined upon, in
case they should find the French at anchor, was for the ships to form
as most convenient for their mutual support, and to anchor by the stern.
"First gain the victory," he said, "and then make the best use of it you
can." The moment he perceived the position of the French, that intuitive
genius with which Nelson was endowed displayed itself; and it instantly
struck him that where there was room for an enemy's ship to swing,
there was room for one of ours to anchor. The plan which he intended to
pursue, therefore, was to keep entirely on the outer side of the French
line, and station his ships, as far as he was able, one on the outer
bow, and another on the outer quarter, of each of the enemy's. This plan
of doubling on the enemy's ships was pro