or an opportunity of retaliation, and that
their plans needed to be carefully watched and counteracted, were
convictions strongly impressed upon Lord Dundonald in these years; and
in 1848 he had a singular verification of them. "I enclose a paper of
some consequence," wrote Lord Auckland to him on the 30th of June. "It
contains the plan which, in contemplation of war, has been submitted to
the French Provisional Government for naval operations. It is, perhaps,
little more than the pamphlet of the Prince de Joinville, carried out
methodically and in detail, and the writer seems to me to anticipate a
far more exclusive playing of the game only on one side than we should
allow to be the case; but, nevertheless, such a mode of warfare would be
embarrassing and mischievous, and I should like to have from you your
views of a counter project to it, and your criticisms upon it."

The report here forwarded to Lord Dundonald by Lord Auckland, entitled
"La Puissance Maritime de la France," and designed to show that "une
guerre maritime est plus a redouter pour l'Angleterre que pour la
France," besides affording curious confirmation of Lord Dundonald's
opinions, is a document very memorable in itself. Its main idea was that
in naval warfare victory is to be obtained, not by mere numbers, but by
superiority in ships and guns. "In the present condition of our marine,"
said its author, "we must give up fleet-fighting. The English can arm
more fleets than we can, and we cannot maintain a war of fleets with
England without exposing ourselves to losses as great as those we
experienced under the First Empire. Though during twenty years, however,
our warfare, as carried on by fleets, was disastrous, that of our
cruisers was nearly always successful. By again sending these forth,
with instructions not to compromise themselves with an enemy superior to
them in numbers, we shall inflict great loss on English commerce. To
attack that commerce is to attack the vital principle of England--to
strike her to the heart."

That was the view advanced under Louis Philippe's reign by the Prince de
Joinville; but it was much more elaborately worked out by the advocate
of naval energy in days immediately preceding Prince Louis Napoleon's
accession to power. "What I propose," he said, "is a war founded on this
principle of striking at English commerce. In a naval war between two
nations, one of which has a very large commerce, and the other very
little, m