ntry, because its first
employment would develop both its principle and application. We
considered, in the next place, how far the adoption of the proposed
secret plans would accord with the feelings and principles of civilized
warfare. We are of unanimous opinion that plans Nos. 2 and 3 would not
be so. We therefore recommend that, as hitherto, plans Nos. 2 and 3
should remain concealed. We feel that great credit is due to Lord
Dundonald for the right feeling which prompted him not to disclose his
secret plans, when serving in war as naval commander-in-chief of the
forces of other nations, and under many trying circumstances, in the
conviction that these plans might eventually be of the highest
importance to his own country."

That report was, in the main, highly gratifying to Lord Dundonald. It
recognized the efficacy of his plans, and recommended their partial use,
at any rate, in time of need. "Permit me to express, as far as I am
able," he wrote to Lord Auckland on the 27th of January, "my deep sense
of obligation to your lordship in causing my plans of war to be
thoroughly investigated by the most competent authorities, and for the
extremely kind terms in which you have informed me of the satisfactory
result. With regard to their disposal, I submit that it would be
advisable to retain them inviolate until a period shall arrive when the
use of them may be deemed beneficial to the interests of the country, I
have to observe, as to the opinions of the commission, that plans Nos. 2
and 3 would not accord with the principles and feeling of civilized
warfare, that the new method resorted to by the French, of firing
horizontal shells and carcases, is stated by a commission of scientific
and practical men appointed by the French Government to ascertain their
effects, to be so formidable that 'it would render impossible the
success of any enterprise attempted against their vessels in harbour,'
and that, 'for the defence of roadsteads, or for the attack of
line-of-battle ships, becalmed or embayed, its effect would be
infallible,'--namely, by blowing up or burning our ships, to the
probable destruction of the lives of all their crews. I submit that,
against such batteries as these, the adoption of my plans Nos. 2 and 3
would be perfectly justifiable."

That the French, not yet forgetful of the injuries inflicted on them in
the last great war, and in the frequent wars of previous centuries, were
still hoping and planning f