l which are
often forced upon private companies. But the greatest source of saving
in public ownership is the value of monopoly privileges that, under
private management, go into private pockets.

The temptation of political corruption may be more insistent when a
large force of men is constantly employed, and when large supplies are
constantly purchased, by public officials, but the temptation is not
so strong or so centralized as it is in the granting of franchises to
wealthy corporations. Public industry is weakened by the absence of
certain motives to excellence that are present in private business.
The income of public officials not being dependent on the economy of
management, the spur and motives of competitive industry are lacking.
No social discovery has made individual honesty and civic virtue
useless to good government.

The decision in any specific case is one dependent on local
conditions, and the exact limits of public ownership are not fixed.
Industry is changing so rapidly that new adjustments are made every
year. The main outlines of public ownership, however, are now in large
part determined. Some industries do well, others ill, under public
management, and between these lie many debatable cases. Waterworks and
probably electric lighting, because of the comparative simplicity of
their operation, are more suitable for public ownership than are gas
works. No absolute line divides the one group from the other. But
whatever the changes, the fact can not be ignored that the increase
of public ownership is altering in manifold ways the organization
of industry, and is reacting upon the production of wealth, and the
distribution of incomes.

[Footnote 1: See above, ch. 16, sec. 5.]

[Footnote 2: See above, ch. 16, sec. 2, on the police function.]

[Footnote 3: See ch. 16, secs. 3 and 4.]

[Footnote 4: See above, ch. 16, sec. 5, statistics of receipts from
public service enterprises.]

CHAPTER 31

SOME ASPECTS OF SOCIALISM

Sec. 1. The distribution of incomes. Sec. 2. Distribution by force and by
status. Sec. 3. Social effects of the right to transmit property. Sec. 4.
Effects of the right to inherit property. Sec. 5. Broader social effects
of inheritance. Sec. 6. Limitations upon intestate inheritance. Sec. 7. Some
merits of competition. Sec. 8. Wide acceptance of competition. Sec. 9.
"Economic harmonies" and discords. Sec. 10. Competition modified by
charitable distribution.