lude
that Britain was justified in requiring the Transvaal Government to
redress the grievances (other than the limited suffrage) which were
complained of. Whether she would be justified in proceeding to enforce
by arms compliance with her demand, would of course depend upon several
things, upon the extent to which the existence of the grievances could
be disproved, upon the spirit in which the Transvaal met the demand,
upon the amount of concessions offered or amendment promised. But before
the British Government entered on a course which might end in war, if
the Transvaal should prove intractable, there were some considerations
which it was bound seriously to weigh.

One of these was the time for entering on a controversy. The Jameson
invasion was only three years old; and the passions it evoked had not
subsided. In it British officers, and troops flying the British flag, if
not Britain herself, had been wrongdoers. Suspicions of British good
faith were known to pervade the Boer mind, and would give an ominous
colour to every demand coming from Britain. The lapse of time might
diminish these suspicions, and give to negotiations a better prospect of
success. Time, moreover, was likely to work against the existing system
of the Transvaal. Bad governments carry the seeds of their own
dissolution. The reforming party among the Transvaal burghers would gain
strength, and try to throw off the existing _regime_. The President was
an old man, whose retirement from power could not be long delayed; and
no successor would be able to hold together as he had done the party of
resistance to reform. In the strife of factions that would follow his
retirement reform was certain to have a far better chance than it could
have had since 1895. In fact, to put it shortly, all the natural forces
were working for the Uitlanders, and would either open the way for their
admission to a share in power, or else make the task of Britain easier
by giving her less united and therefore less formidable antagonists.
These considerations counselled a postponement of the attempt to bring
matters to a crisis.

In the second place the British Government had to remember the
importance of carrying the opinion of the Dutch in Cape Colony, and, as
far as possible, even of the Orange Free State, with them in any action
they might take. It has been pointed out how before December, 1895, that
opinion blamed the Transvaal Government for its unfriendly treatment o