its
garrison in South Africa, and the despatch of one body of troops after
another had been proclaimed with much emphasis in the English
newspapers. Early in October it was announced that the Reserves would be
called out and a powerful force despatched. The Transvaal had meantime
been also preparing for war, so that the sending of British troops might
well, after the beginning of September, be justified as a necessary
precaution, since the forces then in South Africa were inferior in
numbers to those the Boers could muster. But when the latter knew that
an overwhelming force would soon confront them, and draw round them a
net of steel, whence they could not escape, they resolved to seize the
only advantage they possessed, the advantage of time, and to smite
before their enemy was ready. It was therefore, only in a technical or
formal sense that they can be said to have begun the war; for a weak
State, which sees its enemy approach with a power that will soon be
irresistible, has only two alternatives, to submit or to attack at once.
In such a quarrel the responsibility does not necessarily rest with
those who strike first. It rests with those whose action has made
bloodshed inevitable.
A singular result of the course things took was that war broke out
before any legitimate _casus belli_ had arisen. Some one has observed
that whereas many wars have been waged to gain subjects, none was ever
waged before to get rid of subjects by making it easier for them to pass
under another allegiance. The franchise, however, did not constitute a
legitimate cause of war, for the British Government always admitted they
had no right to demand it. The real cause of war was the menacing
language of Britain, coupled with her preparations for war. These led
the Boers also to arm, and, as happened with the arming and
counter-arming of Prussia and Austria in 1866, when each expected an
attack from the other, war inevitably followed. To brandish the sword
before a cause for war has been shown not only impairs the prospect of a
peaceful settlement, but may give the world ground for believing that
war is intended.
By making the concession of the franchise the aim of their efforts, and
supporting it by demonstrations which drove their antagonist to arms,
the British Government placed themselves before the world in the
position of having caused a war without ever formulating a _casus
belli_, and thereby exposed their country to unfavourable com
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