ve had a hand in that attempt, and they think that influential
capitalists have been sedulously scheming against them. Their passion
for independence is something which we in modern Europe find it hard to
realise. It recalls the long struggle of the Swiss for freedom in the
fourteenth century, or the fierce tenacity which the Scotch showed in
the same age in their resistance to the claim of England to be their
"Suzerain Power." This passion was backed by two other sentiments, an
exaggerated estimate of their own strength and a reliance on the
protecting hand of Providence, fitter for the days of the Maccabees or
of Cromwell than for our own time, but which will appear less strange if
the perils through which their nation had passed be remembered.

These were the rocks among which the bark of British diplomacy had to be
steered. They were, however, rocks above water, so it might be hoped
that war could be avoided and some valuable concession secured. To be
landed in war would obviously be as great a failure as to secure no
concession.

Instead of demanding the removal of the specific grievances whereof the
Uitlanders complained, the British Government resolved to endeavour to
obtain for them an easier acquisition of the electoral franchise and an
ampler representation in the legislature. There was much to be said for
this course. It would avoid the tedious and vexatious controversies that
must have arisen over the details of the grievances. It would (in the
long run) secure reform in the best way, viz., by the action of public
spirit and enlightenment within the legislature. It would furnish a
basis for union between the immigrants and the friends of good
government among the burghers themselves, and so conduce to the future
peace of the community. There was, however, one material condition, a
condition which might prove to be an objection, affecting the resort to
it. Since the electoral franchise was a matter entirely within the
competence of the South African Republic, Britain must, if she desired
to abide by the principles of international law, confine herself to
recommendation and advice. She had no right to demand, no right to
insist that her advice should be followed. She could not compel
compliance by force, nor even by the threat of using force. In other
words, a refusal to enlarge the franchise would not furnish any _casus
belli_.

This course having been adopted, the negotiations entered on a new phase
with