y spoken of, this one is not regarded as absolute, but as
capable of being overruled by a stronger obligation of justice on the
other side; or by such conduct on the part of the person concerned as is
deemed to absolve us from our obligation to him, and to constitute a
_forfeiture_ of the benefit which he has been led to expect.

Fifthly, it is, by universal admission, inconsistent with justice to be
_partial_; to show favour or preference to one person over another, in
matters to which favour and preference do not properly apply.
Impartiality, however, does not seem to be regarded as a duty in itself,
but rather as instrumental to some other duty; for it is admitted that
favour and preference are not always censurable, and indeed the cases in
which they are condemned are rather the exception than the rule. A
person would be more likely to be blamed than applauded for giving his
family or friends no superiority in good offices over strangers, when he
could do so without violating any other duty; and no one thinks it
unjust to seek one person in preference to another as a friend,
connexion, or companion. Impartiality where rights are concerned is of
course obligatory, but this is involved in the more general obligation
of giving to every one his right. A tribunal, for example, must be
impartial, because it is bound to award, without regard to any other
consideration, a disputed object to the one of two parties who has the
right to it. There are other cases in which impartiality means, being
solely influenced by desert; as with those who, in the capacity of
judges, preceptors, or parents, administer reward and punishment as
such. There are cases, again, in which it means, being solely influenced
by consideration for the public interest; as in making a selection among
candidates for a Government employment. Impartiality, in short, as an
obligation of justice, may be said to mean, being exclusively influenced
by the considerations which it is supposed ought to influence the
particular case in hand; and resisting the solicitation of any motives
which prompt to conduct different from what those considerations would
dictate.

Nearly allied to the idea of impartiality, is that of _equality_; which
often enters as a component part both into the conception of justice and
into the practice of it, and, in the eyes of many persons, constitutes
its essence. But in this, still more than in any other case, the notion
of justice varies