The feelings concerned are so
powerful, and we count so positively on finding a responsive feeling in
others (all being alike interested), that _ought_ and _should_ grow into
_must_, and recognized indispensability becomes a moral necessity,
analogous to physical, and often not inferior to it in binding force.

If the preceding analysis, or something resembling it, be not the
correct account of the notion of justice; if justice be totally
independent of utility, and be a standard _per se_, which the mind can
recognize by simple introspection of itself; it is hard to understand
why that internal oracle is so ambiguous, and why so many things appear
either just or unjust, according to the light in which they are
regarded. We are continually informed that Utility is an uncertain
standard, which every different person interprets differently, and that
there is no safety but in the immutable, ineffaceable, and unmistakeable
dictates of Justice, which carry their evidence in themselves, and are
independent of the fluctuations of opinion. One would suppose from this
that on questions of justice there could be no controversy; that if we
take that for our rule, its application to any given case could leave us
in as little doubt as a mathematical demonstration. So far is this from
being the fact, that there is as much difference of opinion, and as
fierce discussion, about what is just, as about what is useful to
society. Not only have different nations and individuals different
notions of justice, but, in the mind of one and the same individual,
justice is not some one rule, principle, or maxim, but many, which do
not always coincide in their dictates, and in choosing between which, he
is guided either by some extraneous standard, or by his own personal
predilections.

For instance, there are some who say, that it is unjust to punish any
one for the sake of example to others; that punishment is just, only
when intended for the good of the sufferer himself. Others maintain the
extreme reverse, contending that to punish persons who have attained
years of discretion, for their own benefit, is despotism and injustice,
since if the matter at issue is solely their own good, no one has a
right to control their own judgment of it; but that they may justly be
punished to prevent evil to others, this being an exercise of the
legitimate right of self-defence. Mr. Owen, again, affirms that it is
unjust to punish at all; for the criminal did