ance, to
the common interest of mankind, of maintaining inviolate the sentiment
of submission to law. Other persons, again, hold the directly contrary
opinion, that any law, judged to be bad, may blamelessly be disobeyed,
even though it be not judged to be unjust, but only inexpedient; while
others would confine the licence of disobedience to the case of unjust
laws: but again, some say, that all laws which are inexpedient are
unjust; since every law imposes some restriction on the natural liberty
of mankind, which restriction is an injustice, unless legitimated by
tending to their good. Among these diversities of opinion, it seems to
be universally admitted that there may be unjust laws, and that law,
consequently, is not the ultimate criterion of justice, but may give to
one person a benefit, or impose on another an evil, which justice
condemns. When, however, a law is thought to be unjust, it seems always
to be regarded as being so in the same way in which a breach of law is
unjust, namely, by infringing somebody's right; which, as it cannot in
this case be a legal right, receives a different appellation, and is
called a moral right. We may say, therefore, that a second case of
injustice consists in taking or withholding from any person that to
which he has a _moral right_.
Thirdly, it is universally considered just that each person should
obtain that (whether good or evil) which he _deserves_; and unjust that
he should obtain a good, or be made to undergo an evil, which he does
not deserve. This is, perhaps, the clearest and most emphatic form in
which the idea of justice is conceived by the general mind. As it
involves the notion of desert, the question arises, what constitutes
desert? Speaking in a general way, a person is understood to deserve
good if he does right, evil if he does wrong; and in a more particular
sense, to deserve good from those to whom he does or has done good, and
evil from those to whom he does or has done evil. The precept of
returning good for evil has never been regarded as a case of the
fulfilment of justice, but as one in which the claims of justice are
waived, in obedience to other considerations.
Fourthly, it is confessedly unjust to _break faith_ with any one: to
violate an engagement, either express or implied, or disappoint
expectations raised by our own conduct, at least if we have raised those
expectations knowingly and voluntarily. Like the other obligations of
justice alread
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