sty is good and praiseworthy; which shame or modesty is
not virtue, but a certain good passion. And it says, "In women and the
young," that is to say, in youths; because, as the Philosopher
expresses it in the fourth book of the Ethics, shame, bashfulness,
modesty, is not praiseworthy nor good in the old nor in men of
studious habits, because to them it is fit that they beware of those
things which would lead them to shame. In youths and maidens such
caution is not so much required, and therefore in them the fear of
receiving dishonour through some fault is praiseworthy. It springs
from Nobility, and it is possible to account their timid bashfulness
to be Nobility. Baseness and ignoble ways produce impudence: wherefore
it is a good and excellent sign of Nobility in children and persons of
tender years when, after some fault, their shame is painted in their
face, which blush of shame is then the fruit of true Nobility.

CHAPTER XX.

When it proceeds to say, "Comes virtue from what's noble, as From
black comes violet," the text advances to the desired definition of
Nobility, by which one may see what this Nobility is of which so many
people speak erroneously. It says then, drawing a conclusion from that
which has been said before, that each Virtue, or rather its generator,
that is to say, the habit of right choice, which stands firm in due
moderation, will spring forth from this, that is, Nobility. And it
gives an example in the colours, saying, as from the black the violet,
so this Virtue springs from Nobility. The violet is a mixed colour of
purple and black, but the black prevails, and the colour is named from
it. And thus the Virtue is a mixed thing of Nobility and Passion; but,
because Nobility prevails, the Virtue takes its name from it, and is
called Goodness. Then afterwards it argues, by that which has been
said, that no man ought to say boastfully, "I am of such and such a
race or family;" nor ought he to believe that he is of this Nobility
unless the fruits of it are in him. And immediately it renders a
reason, saying that those who have this Grace, that is to say, this
Divine thing, are almost Gods as it were, without spot of vice, and no
one has the power to bestow this except God alone, with whom there is
no respect of persons, even as Divine Scripture makes manifest. And it
does not appear too extravagant when it says, "They are as Gods," for
as it is argued previously in the seventh chapter of the