ot worthy of
his race? It is no other than to call the Dwarf a Giant." Then
afterwards he says to such an one as this: "Between thee and the
statue erected in memory of thine ancestor there is no other
dissimilarity except that its head is of marble and thine is alive."
And in this (with reverence I say it) I disagree with the poet, for
the statue of marble or of wood or of metal, which has remained in
memory of some worthy brave man, differs much in effect from the
wicked descendant: because the statue always confirms a good opinion
in those who have heard of the good renown or fame of him whose statue
it is, and it begets good opinion in others. But the wicked son or
nephew does quite the contrary: he weakens the good opinion of those
who have heard of the goodness of his ancestors. For some one says to
himself in his thought: "It cannot possibly be true, all this that has
been said about this man's ancestors, since from their seed one sees
an offshoot such as that." Wherefore he ought to receive not honour,
but dishonour, who bears false or evil witness against the good. And
therefore Tullius says that the son of the brave man ought to strive
to bear good witness to the father. Wherefore, in my judgment, even as
he who defames an excellent man deserves to be shunned by all people
and not listened to, even so the vile man descended from good
ancestors deserves to be banned by all; and the good man ought to
close his eyes in order not to see that infamous man casting infamy
upon the goodness which remains in Memory alone. And let this suffice
at present to the first question that was moved.

To the second question it is possible to reply that a race of itself
has no Soul; and indeed it is true that it is called Noble, but it is
in a certain way. Wherefore it is to be known that every whole is
composed of its parts, and there is a certain whole which has a simple
essence in its parts, as in one man there is one essence in all and in
each individual part; and this which is said to be in the part is said
in the same way to be in the whole. There is another whole which has
not a common essential form or essence with the parts, as a heap of
corn; but there is a secondary essence which results from many grains,
which possess in themselves a true and primary essence. And in such a
whole as this they are said to be the qualities of the parts in a
secondary way; wherefore it is called a white heap, because the grains
whereof t