to me to
be somewhat fierce and haughty against me, I made a little ballad, in
which I called her proud and angry, which appears to be contrary to
that which is here reasoned; and therefore I turn to the Song, and,
under colour of teaching it how it is proper that it should excuse
itself, I make an excuse for that which came before. And this, when
one addresses inanimate things, is a figure which is called by
rhetoricians, Prosopopoeia, and the Poets often use it. "My Song, it
seems you speak this to oppose," The intention of which address, to
make it more easy of understanding, it behoves me to divide into three
sections: first, one affirms wherefore excuse is necessary; then, one
proceeds with the excuse, when I say, "Though Heaven, you know;"
finally, I speak to the Song as to a person well skilled in that which
it is right to do when I say, "Be such excuse allowed."

I say, then, in the first place: "My Song, it seems you speak this to
oppose The saying of a sister Song of mine." For the sake of
similitude, I say sister; for as that woman is called a sister who is
born of the same father, so may a man call that work a sister which is
wrought by the same worker; for our work is in some degree a thing
begotten. And I say why it seems opposed or contrary to that sister
Song, saying: "This lovely Lady whom you count divine, Your sister
called disdainful and morose." This accusation being affirmed, I
proceed to the excuse, by quoting an example, wherein the Truth is
quite opposite to the appearance of Truth, and it is quite possible to
take the false semblance of Truth for Truth itself, regarding Truth
itself as Falsehood. I say: "Though Heaven, you know, is ever high and
pure, Men's eyes may fail, and find a star obscure;" where it is shown
that it is the property of colour and light to be visible, as
Aristotle affirms in the second book Of the Soul and in the book on
Sense and Sensation. Other things, indeed, are visible, but it is not
their property to be so, nor to be tangible, as in form, height,
number, motion, and rest, which are said to be subject to the Common
Sense, and which we comprehend by union of many senses; but of colour
and light it is the property to be visible, because with the sight
only we comprehend them. These visible things, both those of which it
is the property and those subject to the Common Sense, inasmuch as
they are visible, come within the eye; I do not say the things, but
their form; th