the Earth, than by the others, because the
Earth is most material, and therefore most remote, and most out of all
proportion to the First most simple and most high Cause, which is
alone Intellectual, that is to say, God.

And although here below there may be placed general degrees of
excellence, nevertheless, singular degrees of excellence may also be
placed; that is to say, that amongst human Souls one Soul may receive
more bountifully than another. And since in the intellectual order of
the Universe one ascends and descends by degrees almost continuous
from the lowest form to the highest, and from the highest to the
lowest, as we see in the visible order of things; and between the
Angelic Nature, which is intellectual, and the Human Soul there may be
no step, but the one rise to the other as it were continuously through
the height of the degrees; and from the Human Soul and the most
perfect soul of the brute animals, again, there may not be any break
in the descent. For as we see many men so vile and of such low
condition that it seems almost that it can be no other than bestial,
so it is to be asserted and firmly believed that there may be some men
so noble and of a condition so exalted that it can be no other than
that of the Angel. Otherwise the human species could not be continued
on every side, which cannot be. Such as these Aristotle calls, in the
seventh book of the Ethics, Divine; and such a one I say that this
Lady is, so that the Divine Virtue, after the manner that it descends
into the Angel, descends into her.

Then when I say, "Fair one who doubt," I prove this by the experience
that it is possible to have of it in those operations which are proper
to the rational Soul, wherein the Divine Light shines forth more
quickly, that is, in the speech and in the actions, which are wont to
be termed conduct and deportment. Wherefore it is to be known that
only man amongst the animals speaks, and has conduct and acts which
are called rational, because he alone has Reason in himself. And if
any one might wish to say, in contradiction, that a certain bird can
speak, as appears true, especially of the magpie and of the parrot;
and that some beast performs acts, or rather things, by rule, as
appears in the ape and in some other; I reply that it is not true that
they speak, nor that they have rules, because they have not Reason,
from which these things must proceed; neither is there in them the
principle of these oper