gels have seen God. For how can a creature see what
is increatable?" Dionysius also says (Div. Nom. i), speaking of God:
"Neither is there sense, nor image, nor opinion, nor reason, nor
knowledge of Him."

Obj. 2: Further, everything infinite, as such, is unknown. But
God is infinite, as was shown above (Q. 7, A. 1). Therefore in
Himself He is unknown.

Obj. 3: Further, the created intellect knows only existing things.
For what falls first under the apprehension of the intellect is
being. Now God is not something existing; but He is rather
super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore God is
not intelligible; but above all intellect.

Obj. 4: Further, there must be some proportion between the knower
and the known, since the known is the perfection of the knower. But no
proportion exists between the created intellect and God; for there is
an infinite distance between them. Therefore the created intellect
cannot see the essence of God.

_On the contrary,_ It is written: "We shall see Him as He is" (1 John
2:2).

_I answer that,_ Since everything is knowable according as it is actual,
God, Who is pure act without any admixture of potentiality, is in
Himself supremely knowable. But what is supremely knowable in itself,
may not be knowable to a particular intellect, on account of the
excess of the intelligible object above the intellect; as, for
example, the sun, which is supremely visible, cannot be seen by the
bat by reason of its excess of light.

Therefore some who considered this, held that no created intellect can
see the essence of God. This opinion, however, is not tenable. For as
the ultimate beatitude of man consists in the use of his highest
function, which is the operation of his intellect; if we suppose that
the created intellect could never see God, it would either never
attain to beatitude, or its beatitude would consist in something else
beside God; which is opposed to faith. For the ultimate perfection of
the rational creature is to be found in that which is the principle of
its being; since a thing is perfect so far as it attains to its
principle. Further the same opinion is also against reason. For there
resides in every man a natural desire to know the cause of any effect
which he sees; and thence arises wonder in men. But if the intellect
of the rational creature could not reach so far as to the first cause
of things, the natural desire would remain void.

Hence it must be absolu