can you, who have none of these advantages, who are, for the most part,
travelling on the roads, often dangerous to most men, who never enter a
town, where you have not less credit than the meanest inhabitant, and are
as obscure as the wretches who prey on the properties of others; in these
circumstances, can you, I say, expect to be safe, merely because you are
a stranger, or perhaps have got passports from the States that promise
you all manner of safety coming or going, or should it be your hard
fortune to be made a slave, you would make such a bad one, that a master
would be never the better for you? For, who would suffer in his family a
man who would not work, and yet expected to live well? But let us see
how masters use such servants.

"When they are too lascivious, they compel them to fast till they have
brought them so low, that they have no great stomach to make love, if
they are thieves, they prevent them from stealing, by carefully locking
up whatever they could take: they chain them for fear they should run
away: if they are dull and lazy, then stripes and scourges are the
rewards we give them. If you yourself, my friend, had a worthless slave,
would you not take the same measures with him?" "I would treat such a
fellow," answered Aristippus, "with all manner of severity, till I had
brought him to serve me better. But, Socrates, let us resume our former
discourse."

"In what do they who are educated in the art of government, which you
seem to think a great happiness, differ from those who suffer through
necessity? For you say they must accustom themselves to hunger and
thirst, to endure cold and heat, to sleep little, and that they must
voluntarily expose themselves to a thousand other fatigues and hardships.
Now, I cannot conceive what difference there is between being whipped
willingly and by force, and tormenting one's body either one way or the
other, except that it is a folly in a man to be willing to suffer pain."
"How," said Socrates, "you know not this difference between things
voluntary and constrained, that he who suffers hunger because he is
pleased to do so may likewise eat when he has a mind; and he who suffers
thirst because he is willing may also drink when he pleases. But it is
not in the power of him who suffers either of them through constraint and
necessity to relieve himself by eating and drinking the moment he desires
it? Besides, he that voluntarily embraceth any laborious exerc