llow-citizens who
look to home production, or more consumption of the fabrics of the
tariff States as a relief from our present burdens, we perceive in
these expedients rather an ill-judged wasting of the public energy and
diversion of the public mind than an adequate remedy for the true
evil, the usurping of Congress, which (since that body will never
construe down its own powers) can be checked, in our opinion, only by
the action of States opposed to such usurpation."

The reference to "expedients, rather an ill-judged wasting of the
public energy," was to the action of certain meetings in South
Carolina where it was resolved to wear only their own manufactures,
and abstain wholly from those made north of the Potomac. The
supporters of nullification defended themselves on constitutional
grounds and on the Kentucky and Virginia resolutions of 1798. Congress
revised the tariff in May, 1832, modifying some of the duties imposed
by the act of 1828. In October, 1832, the Legislature of South
Carolina passed an act providing for the calling of a convention of
the people of the State.

The object of the convention was "to take into consideration the
several acts of the Congress of the United States imposing duties on
foreign imports, for the protection of domestic manufactures or for
other unauthorized objects; to determine on the character thereof, and
to devise the means of redress."

The convention authorized under this act assembled on November 19,
1832. An ordinance was passed to provide for arresting the operations
of certain acts of Congress of the United States, purporting to be
taxes laying duties and imposts on the importation of foreign
commodities. On its final passage the word "arresting" was stricken
out and the word "nullifying" substituted in its place.

The substance of this ordinance was to interdict the action of the
courts, and to require all officers to take an oath to obey the
ordinance and the laws passed to give it effect. It also declared that
the tariff acts of 1828 and 1832 were null, void, and not binding on
the State, its officers or citizens. It further declared it to be
unlawful for any of the constituted authorities of the State or of the
United States to enforce the payment of the duties imposed by the act
within the limits of the State of South Carolina. Other provisions
were that no case of law or equity decided in South Carolina, in which
was involved the question of the validity of t