to deaden her way, to make the
needed room ahead for the _Ocean_, and also to allow the rear ships
to close. "At a quarter past one," testified Captain Maitland of the
_Elizabeth_, 74, "we were very close behind the _Formidable_, and a
midshipman upon the poop called out that there was a ship coming on
board on the weatherbow. I put the helm up,... and found, when the
smoke cleared away, I was shot up under the _Formidable's_ lee. She
was then engaged with the two last ships in the French fleet, and, as
I could not fire at them without firing through the _Formidable_, I
was obliged to shoot on."[47] Captain Bazely, of the _Formidable_,
says of the same incident, "The _Formidable_ did at the time of action
bear up to one of the enemy's ships, to avoid being aboard of her,
whose jib boom nearly touched the main topsail weather leech of the
_Formidable_. I thought we could not avoid being on board."

Contrary to the usual result, the loss of the rear division, in killed
and wounded, was heaviest, nearly equalling the aggregate of the two
others.[48] This was due to the morning signal to chase to windward,
which brought these ships closer than their leaders. As soon as the
British van, ten ships, had passed the French rear, its commander,
Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland, anticipating Keppel's wishes,
signalled it to go about and follow the enemy (Fig. 2, V). As the
French column was running free, these ships, when about, fetched to
windward of its wake. When the _Victory_ drew out of the fire, at 1
P.M., Keppel also made a similar signal, and attempted to wear (c),
the injuries to his rigging not permitting tacking; but caution was
needed in manoeuvring across the bows of the following ships, and it
was not till 2 P.M., that the _Victory_ was about on the other tack
(Fig. 2, C), heading after the French. At this time, 2 P.M., just
before or just after wearing, the signal for battle was hauled down,
and that for the line of battle was hoisted. The object of the latter
was to re-form the order, and the first was discontinued, partly
because no longer needed, chiefly that it might not seem to contradict
the urgent call for a re-formation.

At this time six or seven of Harland's division were on the weather
bow of the _Victory_, to windward (westward), but a little ahead, and
standing like her after the French; all on the port tack (Fig. 2).
None of the centre division succeeded in joining the flagship at once.
At 2.30 Palli