out their own admiral, and to remain
there when the signals for the line of battle, and to bear down in the
admiral's wake, were flying. Thus Palliser's own inaction, to whatever
cause due, paralysed the six or eight sail with him; but it appears
to the writer that Keppel was seriously remiss in not summoning those
ships by their own pennants, as soon as he began to distrust the
purposes of the Vice-Admiral, instead of delaying doing so till
7 P.M., as he did. It is a curious picture presented to us by the
evidence. The Commander-in-Chief, with his staff and the captain of
the ship, fretting and fuming on the _Victory's_ quarter-deck; the
signals flying which have been mentioned; Harland's division getting
into line ahead; and four points on the weather quarter, only two
miles distant, so that "every gun and port could be counted," a group
of seven or eight sail, among them the flag of the third in command,
apparently indifferent spectators. The _Formidable's_ only sign of
disability was the foretopsail unbent for four hours,--a delay which,
being unexplained, rather increased than relieved suspicion, rife then
throughout the Navy. Palliser was a Tory, and had left the Board of
Admiralty to take his command. Keppel was so strong a Whig that he
would not serve against the Americans; and he evidently feared that he
was to be betrayed to his ruin.

Palliser's defence rested upon three principal points: (1), that the
signal for the line of battle was not seen on board the _Formidable_;
(2), that the signal to get into the Admiral's wake was repeated by
himself; (3), that his foremast was wounded, and, moreover, found
to be in such bad condition that he feared to carry sail on it. As
regards the first, the signal was seen on board the _Ocean_, next
astern of and "not far from"[51] the _Formidable_; for the second, the
Admiral should have been informed of a disability by which a single
ship was neutralizing a division. The frigate that brought Keppel's
message could have carried back this. Thirdly, the most damaging
feature to Palliser's case was that he asserted that, after coming out
from under fire, he wore at once towards the enemy; afterwards he wore
back again. A ship that thus wore twice before three o'clock, might
have displayed zeal and efficiency enough to run two miles, off
the wind,[52] at five, to support a fight. Deliberate treachery is
impossible. To this writer the Vice-Admiral's behaviour seems that of
a man