simply
expediency--the most subtle of all political reasons and the hardest to
define. But just as Britain declared war because the invasion of Belgium
brought to a head all the vague grounds for opposition to German policy;
and just as America broke off relations because the scrapping of
undertaking after undertaking regarding the sea-war made it imperative
for her to act, so did China choose the right moment to enunciate the
doctrine of her independence by voicing her determination to hold to the
whole corpus of international sanctions on which her independence
finally rests. In the last analysis, then, the Chinese note of the 9th
February to the German Government was a categorical and unmistakable
reply to all the insidious attempts which had been made since the
beginning of the war to place her outside and beyond the operation of
the Public Law of Europe; and it is solely and entirely in that light
that her future actions must be judged. The leaders who direct the
destinies of China became fully prepared for a state of belligerency
from the moment they decided to speak; but they could not but be
supremely anxious concerning the expression of that belligerency, since
their international position had for years been such that a single false
move might cripple them.

Let us make this clear. Whilst China has been from the first fully
prepared to co-operate with friendly Powers in the taking of
war-measures which would ultimately improve her world-position, she has
not been prepared to surrender the initiative in these matters into
foreign hands. The argument that the mobilization of her resources could
only be effectively dealt with by specially designated foreigners, for
instance, has always been repellent to her because she knows from bitter
experience that although Japan has played little or no part in the war,
and indeed classifies herself as a semi-belligerent, the Tokio
Government would not hesitate to use any opportunity which presented
itself in China for selfish ends; and by insisting that as she is on the
spot she is the most competent to insure the effectiveness of Chinese
co-operation, attempt to tighten her hold on the country. It is a fact
which is self-evident to observers on the spot that ever since the coup
of the Twenty-one Demands, many Japanese believe that their country has
succeeded in almost completely infeodating China and has become the
sovereign arbitrator of all quarrels, as well as the pacific