rily be Britain more than any
other European country which would influence Chinese destinies. But the
British Alliance with Japan had greatly weakened the trust which
originally existed; and this added to the fact that Germany, although
completely isolated and imprisoned by the sea, still maintained herself
intact by reason of her marvellous war-machine, which had ploughed
forward with such horrible results in a number of directions, had made
inaction seem the best policy. And yet, although the Chinese may be
pardoned for not forming clear concepts regarding the rights and wrongs
of the present conflict, they had undoubtedly realized that it was
absolutely essential for them not to remain outside the circle of
international friendships when a direct opportunity was offered them to
step within.
It was a sudden inkling of these things which now dawned on the public
mind and slowly awakened enthusiasm. For the first time since Treaty
relations with the Powers had been established Chinese diplomatic action
had swept beyond the walls of Peking and embraced world-politics within
its scope. The Confucianist conception of the State, as being simply a
regional creation, a thing complete in itself and all sufficient because
it was locked to the past and indifferent to the future, had hitherto
been supreme, foreign affairs being the result of unwilling contact at
sea-ports or in the wastes of High Asia where rival empires meet. To
find Chinese--five years after the inauguration of their Republic--ready
to accept literally and loyally in the western way all the duties and
obligations which their rights of eminent domain confer was a great and
fine discovery. It has been supposed by some that a powerful role was
played in this business by the temptation to benefit materially by an
astute move: that is that China was greatly influenced in her decision
by the knowledge that the denouncing of the German treaties would
instantly suspend the German Boxer indemnity and pour into the depleted
Central Treasury a monthly surplus of nearly two million Mexican
dollars. Paradoxical as it may sound in a country notoriously
hard-pressed for cash, monetary considerations played no part whatever
in convincing the Peking Government that the hour for action had
arrived; nor again was there any question of real hostility to a nation
which is so far removed from the East as to be meaningless to the
masses. The deep, underlying, decisive influence was
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