o syde, and unmyght on that
other, or elles other cause resonable yat shal move him." Rot. Parl.
vol. iv. p. 343. Mr. Bruce has well observed of the articles agreed upon
in 8 Hen. VI., or rather of "those in 5 Hen. VI., which were nearly the
same, that in theory nothing could be more excellent. In turbulent
times, it is scarcely necessary to remark, great men were too apt to
weigh out justice for themselves, and with no great nicety; a court,
therefore, to which the people might fly for relief against powerful
oppressors, was most especially needful. Law charges also were
considerable; and this, 'the poor man's court, in which he might have
right without paying any money' (Sir T. Smith's Commonwealth, book iii.
ch. 7), was an institution apparently calculated to be of unquestionable
utility. It was the comprehensiveness of the last clause--the 'other
cause resonable'--which was its ruin." Archaeologia, vol. xxv. p. 348.
The statute 31 Hen. VI. c. 2, which is not printed in Ruffhead's
edition, is very important, as giving a legal authority to the council,
by writs under the great seal, and by writs of proclamation to the
sheriffs, on parties making default, to compel the attendance of any
persons complained of for "great riots, extortions, oppressions, and
grievous offences," under heavy penalties; in case of a peer, "the loss
of his estate, and name of lord, and his place in parliament," and all
his lands for the term of his life; and fine at discretion in the case
of other persons. A proviso is added that no matter determinable by the
law of the realm should be determined in other form than after the
course of law in the king's courts. Sir Francis Palgrave (Essay on the
King's Council, p. 84) observes that this proviso "would in no way
interfere with the effective jurisdiction of the council, inasmuch as it
could always be alleged in the bills which were preferred before it that
the oppressive and grievous offences of which they complained were not
determinable by the ordinary course of the common law" p. 86. But this
takes the word "determinable" to mean _in fact_; whereas I apprehend
that the proviso must be understood to mean cases legally determinable;
the words, I think, will bear no other construction. But as all the
offences enumerated were indictable, we must either hold the proviso to
be utterly inconsistent with the rest of the statute, or suppose that
the words "other form" were intended to prohibit the irregu