Zealand and Copenhagen. To treat separately with that prince
was a thing he could not do, as foreseeing that he would not part with
an inch of ground to so unfair an enemy; and he was afraid that a
Congress for a general place, supposing the King of Sweden would consent
to it upon the terms proposed by his enemies, would draw the
negotiations out beyond what the situation of his affairs could bear. He
invites, therefore, all his confederates to make a home thrust at the
King of Sweden, by a descent into his country, where, having defeated
him, as by the superiority of the forces to be employed in that design
he hoped they should, they might force him to an immediate peace on such
terms as they themselves pleased. I don't know how far the rest of his
confederates came into that project; but neither the _Prussian_ nor the
_Hanoverian_ Court appeared _openly_ in that project, _and how far our
English fleet, under Sir John Norris, was to have forwarded it, I have
nothing to say, but leave others to judge out of the King of Denmark's
own declaration_: but the Czar came readily into it. He got thereby a
new pretence to carry the war one campaign more at other people's
expense; to march his troops into the Empire again, and to have them
quartered and maintained, first in Mecklenburg and then in Zealand. In
the meantime he had his eyes upon _Wismar_, and upon a Swedish island
called _Gotland_. If, by surprise, he could get the first out of the
hands of his confederates, he then had a good seaport, whither to
transport his troops when he pleased into _Germany_, without asking the
King of _Prussia's_ leave for a free passage through his territories;
and if, by a sudden descent, he could dislodge the _Swedes_ out of the
other, he then became master of the best port in the Baltic. He
miscarried, however, in both these projects; for Wismar was too well
guarded to be surprised; and he found his confederates would not give
him a helping hand towards conquering Gotland. After this he began to
look with another eye upon the descent to be made upon Schonen. He found
it equally contrary to his interest, whether it succeeded or not. For if
he did, and the King was thereby forced to a general peace, he knew his
interests therein would be least regarded; having already notice enough
of his confederates being ready to sacrifice them, provided they got
their own terms. If he did not succeed, then, besides the loss of the
flower of an army he ha